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1 Introduction.   
A federal assembly consists of a number of representatives for each of the nations 
(states, Länder, cantons,...) that make up the federation.  How many representatives 
should each nation receive?  What makes this issue worth quibbling about is that the 
model of representation that is instituted will have an impact on the welfare distribution 
over the nations in the federation that will ensue over due course.  We will investigate 
what models of representation yield welfare distributions that score higher on a utilitarian 
measure.  First, we construct a continuum of models of representation ranging from equal 
to proportional representation.  In between these extremes are models of degressive 
proportionality.  We run a Monte-Carlo simulation in which a large number of motions 
are voted up or down within different contexts of evaluation and investigate how well the 
resulting welfare distributions score on the utilitarian measure.  Subsequently, we will 
provide matching analytical results for a slightly idealized case.   We conclude with a 
discussion of the significance of our results and of the role of simulations and analytical 
results and point to further work.  
 
2 The Federation, its Constituent Nations and Models of Representation.   
Let there be a federation that has a total population of S people.  It is divided into N 
nations, some of them larger, some of them smaller.  Each nation i has a population size 
of si.  The federal assembly is the decision-making organ for the federation.  Our model 
can be readily generalized, but just to have some definite numbers, we will run our 
simulations with the actual population sizes of the European Union (see Table 1) and 
with the actual number of representatives in the Council of Ministers of the European 
Union before the 2004 enlargement.  By using the pre-enlargement data we can avoid 
computational complexity and nothing is lost since the European Union is just a token 
federation in our investigation.    
To represent the continuum between equal representation and proportional 
representation in the assembly, we construct the following measure, which determines the 
proportion of representatives of nation i in the assembly: 
 
(1) ri(α) =  ∑
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α
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 for xi = si / S and α ∈  [0, 1] 
 
α is a measure of the degree of proportionality.  ri(0) = 1/N and there is equal 
representation in the assembly.  ri(1) = xi and there is proportional representation in the 
assembly.  Intermediate values of α represent models of representation of degressive 
proportionality that are located on the continuum between both extremes.  Obviously, 
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3 Voting on Motions 
A motion affects the people of the respective nations in different ways.  A motion to 
improve the defense of the federation may benefit each nation to the same extent.  But a 
motion to improve the highway system in some nation on the periphery of the federation 
does little more than benefit the nation in question, while it constitutes a cost to the other 
nations.  A motion can be thought off as a utility vector <v1, ..., vi,..., vN> in which each vi 
represents the expected utility that the motion will bring to an arbitrary person of nation i 
if the motion were adopted.   
There is a certain threshold value of utility so that all the representatives of a 
nation will vote in favor of the motion if the utility that this motion will bring to the 
nation in question exceeds the threshold value.  They vote against the motion if the utility 
drops below the threshold value.  They will abstain if the utility equals the threshold 
value.  Let us say that the threshold value is the point at which the costs balance out 
                                                          
1 This is a complex question in voting theory, but for our purposes the following simple system suffices.  
We multiply the number of representatives T in the Council with the ratio ri(α).  We assign, in a first step, 
[ri(α)T]—i.e. the whole number smaller than or equal to ri(α)T—representatives to each nation i.  The 
number of remaining seats is k(α) = T – .  Clearly k(α) < N.  These k(α) seats are distributed 
as follows.  We order the nations according to the relative sizes of the decimal parts ri(α)T – [ri(α)T], going 
from larger to smaller.  We now assign to each of the first k(α) nations in this ordering precisely one 
additional seat.  Let Ri(α) be the number of seats that each nation i receives in the assembly on the 
proportionality measure α. 
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against the benefits for the nation of question.  Costs and benefits should be understood 
broadly.  They may also reflect feelings of altruism between the nations in question. 
 
4 Contexts of Evaluation 
David Hume (1888 [1739]: Book III, Part II, Section II) notoriously believed that 
questions of justice only arise if we can expect moderate selfishness (and not 
benevolence or extreme selfishness) and in times of relative scarcity (and not in times of 
extreme scarcity or abundance).  We will not follow Hume’s contention that questions of 
justice only arise under these conditions, but his taxonomy comes in handy in 
distinguishing between alternative contexts of evaluation:  
(i) Benevolence and Abundance.  In times of economic prosperity, or amongst nations 
that genuinely care about the well being of the other nations, the benefits that nations 
receive when a motion is adopted tend to outweigh the costs more often than not.  There 
is money enough to go around so that costs matter minimally and there is a positive 
disposition towards political initiatives in general so that each nation’s utility from a 
motion receives an added bonus.  To model this situation, we let the utility values in the 
vector that represents a motion be random numbers generated under a uniform 
distribution over the range [-.5, 1] and we set the threshold value for acceptance at vt = 0.  
Hence, the chance that an arbitrary nation will vote for a motion is 2/3.  Let us name this 
the context of generous voters.  
(ii) Extreme Scarcity and Extreme Selfishness.  In times of economic recession, or 
amongst nations that are strictly concerned with their own welfare, the costs of a motion 
tend to outweigh the benefits more often than not.  The nations are wary of expenditures 
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and they only benefit from the implementation of motions in support of projects that 
directly affect their own welfare.  We let the utility values be random numbers generated 
under a uniform distribution over the range [-1, .5] with vt = 0.  Hence, the chance that an 
arbitrary nation will vote for some motion is 1/3.  This is the context of stingy voters. 
(iii) Moderate Selfishness and Relative Scarcity.  This context is intermediate between 
the previous two poles of the continuum. We let the utility values be random numbers 
generated under a uniform distribution over the range [-1,1] with vt = 0.  The chance that 
an arbitrary nation will support a motion is 1/2.  This is the context of balanced voters. 
 Clearly there are alternative ways of understanding and modeling Hume’s 
conditions.  As we shall see later, the only thing that is required for our purposes is that 
particular specifications of three parameters of these distributions provide a meaningful 
characterization of certain types of voters.  The Humean labels are no more than 
mnemonic aids.  
 
5  Evaluating Models of Representation by Means of Monte-Carlo Simulations  
Models of representation in a federal assembly are social arrangements.  Each value of α 
constitutes an alternative social arrangement.  We start with the model of equal 
representation (α = 0) and increase the value of α with increments of ∆α (which we set in 
our computer simulation at .01) until we reach the model of proportional representation 
(α = 1).  We consider m motions for some sufficiently large m, say m = 10,000, in our 
calculations.  That is, we generate m n-dimensional vectors <v1k, ..., vik, ..., vNk> for k = 
1,..., m with  random numbers in the ranges that correspond to the respective contexts of 
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evaluation.  For each motion, a vote is taken by an assembly whose constitution is based 
on a particular value of α.  The representatives of a nation i will all vote for a motion if 
vik exceeds the threshold value vt that we take to be same for all nations; they will all vote 
against the motion if vik is lower than vt; and they will abstain if vik equals vt.  If the 
motion k is accepted, each nation i is assigned a utility value vik.  If the motion is not 
accepted, then it is discarded and each nation remains unaffected by the motion.  After 
the m motions have all been considered, we divide the sum of the utilities that each nation 
has accrued by m: the resulting vector u(α) = <u1(α), ..., ui(α), ..., uN(α)> contains the 
utilities ui(α) that a person in nation i can expect from a motion, given a particular model 
of representation represented by a specific value of the parameter α.  At the end of this 
process we have a vector of utility distributions associated with the values of α, viz. 
<u(0), u(∆α), u(2∆α),..., u(1)>, or, more specifically, in our computer simulation, <u(0), 
u(.01), u(.02), ..., u(1)>.  The measure that is to be maximized is the sum of the 
component utility values ui(α) in the utility vector u(α) weighted by the respective 
population proportions xi:   
 
(4) Mutil[u(α)] = ∑
=
α
N
i 1
)(iiux  
 
The model of representation α that maximizes this measure is the social arrangement that 
is supported by the utilitarian conception of justice.   The results of our simulations are 
represented in Figures 1, 2 and 3.   
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6   Matching Analytical Results   
The measure Mutil is an expectation, viz. the expected utility E[U] from an arbitrary 
motion.  We will compute this expectation by conditioning on the propositional variables 
A and C.  The variable A equals A when the motion is accepted and ¬A when the motion 
is not accepted.  To define the variable C, construct all the combinations of i nations 
voting for the motion and N – i nations voting against the motion.  From combinatorial 
analysis, we know that there are ∑ such combinations.  The variable C equals 
C
N
N
i i
N
2
0
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=
1 when all the nations vote for the motion, C2 when all nations except for nation N vote 
for the motion,..., and C2N when all nations vote against the motions.  By the probability 
calculus, 
 
(5) E[U] = E[U|A, C]P(A, C). ∑∑ =¬= NC,...,CAA, 21CΑ
 
Notice that E[U|¬A, C] equals 0 for any values of C, since the expected utility of a 
rejected motion is 0.  Furthermore, by the chain rule, P(A, C) = P(A|C)P(C).  Hence,  
 
(6) E[U] = ∑= NC,...,C 21C E[U|A, C]P(A|C)P(C). 
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In Table 2 we illustrate this calculation for a federation of two nations named ‘1’ and ‘2’.  
Each row lists the factors within each term of the sum in (6).  First, let u+ be the utility 
that a nation derives from an accepted motion assuming that they voted for the motion.  
u+ equals 1/2 for generous and balanced voters and 1/4 for stingy voters.  Let u– be the 
utility that a nation derives from an accepted motion assuming that they voted against the 
motion.  u– equals –1/2 for generous and balanced voters, and –1/4 for stingy voters.  On 
row 2 of the table, nation 1 voted for and nation 2 voted against.  Hence, assuming that 
the motion is accepted, the expected utility from this motion is the sum of the u+ and u–, 
weighted by the population proportions of the respective nations.  Second, the chance that 
the motion will be accepted depends on the proportion of the representatives in the 
assembly.  The function g(y) is defined as before, i.e. it equals 1 if y > 0 and 0 if y ≤  0.  
The chance that a motion is accepted equals 1 if a majority supports the motion, i.e. if R1 
– R2 > 0, and equals 0 if the majority does not support the motion, if i.e. R1 – R2≤ 0.  Note 
that the values of Ri are a function of xi and α for i = 1, 2.  Third, let p be the chance that 
an arbitrary nation will vote for a motion.  We have seen before that p equals 1/2 for 
balanced voters, 2/3 for generous voters and 1/3 for stingy voters.  On row 2, the chance 
that the particular combination of nation 1 voting for and nation 2 voting against the 
motion equals p(1 – p).  In the last column we construct the product of these factors on 
each row and on the last row we construct the sum of these products.       
The computational time in constructing a plot for α ∈  [0, 1] can be substantially 
reduced by assuming that the assembly has an infinite number of members, so that we 
can actually conduct a vote by means of the ratios ri(α).  This may seem like an 
unrealistic idealization, but the fact of the matter is that this idealization makes very little 
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difference.  We calculate E[U] for stingy, generous and balanced voters in the European 
Union for α ∈  [0, 1] and have plotted these functions in Figures 4, 5 and 6.  Note that the 
functions in Figures 3, 4 and 5 approximate the simulation results in Figures 1, 2 and 3.    
It is worth noting that the function E[U] is fully determined by the parameters u+, 
u– and  p for a particular federation.  In our simulation we specified a uniform distribution 
for vi for i = 1,..., N.   But the only features of this distribution that are relevant are the 
probability p that an arbitrary nation will accept a motion, the expected utility u– of an 
accepted motion for a nation that voted against the motion and the expected utility u+ of 
an accepted motion for a nation that voted against the motion.  As long as we keep these 
parameters fixed, the particular shape of the distribution is of no consequence for the 
quantities of interest in this paper.     
 
7 Discussion 
What is surprising about these results is the following.  One might expect that 
utilitarianism would support proportional representation and that the only reason for 
instituting degressively proportional models is to protect the interests of smaller nations 
in the federation.  In other words, it is a concern for equality or for the plight of the 
underdog that makes us move away from strict proportional representation.  However, it 
turns out that also a strict utilitarian should support models of degressive proportionality 
once we give up the presumption of balanced voters and move in the direction of stingy 
or generous voters.  
 We have decided to present both the simulation results and analytical results.  The 
reason for including the simulation is that we can obtain results for a finite number of 
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representatives and that the assumption of independent and identically distributed utility 
distributions can be readily relaxed.  If we want to model dependencies between the 
utilities for certain nations (e.g. Mediterranean nations) or let different nations have 
different expectations from motions, then we can generate vectors of utility values under 
a multivariate distribution in which the i.i.d. assumption does not hold.  The reason for 
including the analytical result is that it shows how the results are invariant under 
alternative utility distributions under the i.i.d. assumption.  The only parameters that 
matter are the parameters for the probability of acceptance, for the expected utility of a 
motion for a nation given that it will vote for the motion and for the expected utility of a 
motion for a nation given that it will vote against a motion.   
We have restricted ourselves here to models of degressive proportionality that can 
be characterized by the α parameter and in which motions are accepted by a simple 
majority vote.  The actual models that have been proposed for the EU Council of 
Ministers are much more complex.  In Beisbart, Bovens and Hartmann (forthcoming) we 
present a utilitarian evaluation of various models of representation with different quotas 
of acceptance that have been discussed in academic and political contexts.2 
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 Fig. 1: The Utilitarian Measure for Balanced Voters for Europe and 87 Representatives 
in the Council of Ministers 
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Fig. 2: The Utilitarian Measure for Generous Voters for Europe and 87 Representatives 
in the Council of Ministers 
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Fig. 3: The Utilitarian Measure for Stingy Voters for Europe and 87 Representatives in 
the Council of Ministers 
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Fig. 4: The function E[U] for Balanced Voters for Europe and an Infinite Number of 
Representatives 
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Fig. 5: The function E[U] for Generous Voters for Europe and an Infinite Number of 
Representatives 
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Fig. 6: The function E[U] for Stingy Voters for Europe and an Infinite Number of 
Representatives 
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Austria 7.9 .0214 
Belgium 10 .0271 
Denmark 5.2 .0141 
Finland 5 .0136 
France 57.2 .1550 
Germany 81.2 .2201 
Greece 10.2 .0276 
Ireland 3.5 .0095 
Italy 57.8 .1566 
Luxembourg .3897 .0011 
Netherlands 15.1 .0409 
Portugal 9.8 .0266 
Spain 39.1 .1060 
Sweden 8.8 .0238 
UK 57.6 .1561 
Total 369 1 
      
Table 1: Population sizes in Millions (Second Column) and Population Proportions 
(Third Column) of the Constituent Nations of the EU in 2004 
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  1 2 E[U|A, Ci] P(A|Ci) P(Ci) ∏  
C1 + + u+x1 + u+x2 g(R1 + R2) p2  
C2 + – u+x1 + u–x2 g(R1 – R2) p(1 – p)  
C3 – + u–x1 + u+x2 g(–R1 + R2) (1 – p)p  
C4 – – u–x1 + u–x2 g(–R1 – R2) (1 – p)2  
 ∑  
 
Table 2:  Construction of the Function E[U] in Equation (6) 
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